In this paper we study the role of covenants in franchise contracts that restrict the recruitment and hiring of employees from other units within the same franchise chain in suppressing competition for workers. Based on an analysis of 2016 Franchise Disclosure Documents, we find that "nopoaching of workers agreements" are included in a surprising 58 percent of major franchisors' contracts, including McDonald's, Burger King, Jiffy Lube and H&R Block. The implications of these no-poaching agreements for models of oligopsony are also discussed. No-poaching agreements are more common for franchises in low-wage and high-turnover industries. Since this paper was written at least 62 franchise firms have dropped their no-poach clauses as a result of legal action associated with the circulation of this paper.
I. Introduction
Economists have long been interested in the extent to which employers use market power or collusive actions to suppress pay and restrict competition in the labor market. This interest extends back at least to Adam Smith (1776), who maintained that employers "are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate." Smith, however, noted a critical impediment to subsequent studies of the extent of collusive behavior on the part of employers that has hindered research:
"We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things, which nobody ever hears of."
There is another reason why such behavior often flies below the radar screen: collusive agreements by employers to refrain from hiring each other's employees or to suppress compensation are unlawful under the Sherman Antitrust Act and potentially a criminal offense.
The Department of Justice Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission's (2016) joint
Antitrust Guidance for Human Resources Professionals plainly states, "Agreements among employers not to recruit certain employees or not to compete on terms of compensation are illegal." Although comprehensive data on the extent of collusion is unavailable, a smattering of successful high-profile antitrust cases brought against high-tech companies (e.g., Apple, Google) and film animators (e.g., The Walt Disney Company and Dreamworks), and some lower profile cases against other employers (e.g., Detroit hospitals), suggest that "gentlemen's anti-poaching and wage-fixing agreements" still exist and may be a common practice among employers.
In this paper we seek to shed light on the extent of employer collusive action to restrict competition in the labor market by examining the prevalence of covenants in franchise contracts that restrict the recruitment and hiring of employees from other units within the same franchise chain. McDonald's franchise, refused to "release" her to change jobs.
Perhaps because such agreements have not faced a legal challenge in the past, franchise contracts provide a rare opportunity to observe and measure efforts to orchestrate behavior by employers to restrict recruitment and hiring, and thereby limit labor market competition within affiliated companies, for a comprehensive universe of major employers. Specifically, we examine data drawn from the 2016 franchise agreements used by 156 of the largest franchise chains in the U.S. Franchise Disclosure Documents (FDDs) are available for almost all major franchisors because several states require franchisors to register such information as a condition of doing business in their state. At our request, FRANdata, a research and advisory firm, For the i th firm, profits are maximized when:
where Si is the i th firm's share of employment, ELw is now the industry labor supply elasticity, and ai represents the firm's perceived effect of its hiring on all other employer hiring (sometimes called an employer's conjecture). Dansby and Willig show that an aggregate measure of monopsony power using (2), which is also a measure of the potential for regulatory action to improve welfare, is
Notice that when Mis large there is a prospect of improving welfare by reducing monopsony 
where H is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of competition, H = L s?. Just as with product markets, H is also a useful index of labor market competition, especially in cases where workers 6 Formally, ai is I: j ;ti dL/dLi, where Li is the labor supply to firm i and L j is labor supply to firm j.
level data on the year the franchise was founded, the number of franchise and corporate units operating in 2015, and the number of franchise outlets in each state from FDDs. as an exploratory exercise to learn about the correlates of no-poaching agreements. With this caveat in mind, the most robust predictor in the lo git equations is our measure of turnover:
industries with a higher new hire rate are more likely to have a no-poaching agreement. There is little evidence that no-poaching agreements arise in industries that are more likely to utilize specific training or intellectual property, as no-poaching agreements are more prevalent in lower wage industries and education has a small and statistically insignificant relationship. Table 3 explores the effect of franchisor and industry characteristics, such as the share of establishments in the industry represented by the franchisor and the age of the franchisor. Given the apparent importance of the new-hire rate in Table 3 , that variable is also included in the models shown in columns 4 and 5. None of the characteristics of franchisors are significant predictors of the occurrence of no-poaching agreements, although the percent of employment in the industry belonging to a franchise chain (either a company-owned or franchised unit) is positive and on the margin of statistical significance at the 10 percent level (t-ratio = 1.61 ). When the new hire rate is added to the logit equation, however, it is the only significant predictor of no-poaching agreements and the industry franchise share becomes negative (and still statistically insignificant). Thus, this exploratory statistical analysis suggests the potential role of high turnover in franchisors' decisions to include no-poaching agreements in franchise contracts.
V. Conclusion
Agreements to refrain from recruiting and hiring away employees from other units in a franchise chain are common in franchise contracts. Such no-poaching agreements can limit turnover and reduce labor market competition. Although no-poaching agreements are more common in some industries (e.g., QSR) than others (e.g., Real Estate), the only variable that we have found that consistently predicts the occurrence of no-poaching agreements is labor turnover, measured by the industry-level new hire rate.
Anecdotal evidence from recent court cases suggests that at least some franchisees do abide by no-poaching agreements, but systematic evidence on the impact of no-poaching agreements on workers' pay and within-franchise job mobility is unavailable. A first order question for future research is to document whether within-franchise job-to-job transitions are lower for franchise chains that have no-poaching agreements compared with those that do not contain such agreements. For example, an audit study that varies job applicants' work histories could provide some evidence on whether franchises that are covered by no-poaching agreements are comparatively less likely to request interviews with candidates who report that they currently work for a franchise outlet within the same chain, as opposed to another employer, than are franchises that are not covered by a no-poaching agreement.
No-poaching agreements provide a rare opportunity to study efforts by employers to restrict competition. The occurrence of no-poaching agreements in franchise contracts suggests 20 that, as Adam Smith (1776) predicted, many employers do try to combine to restrict competition.
Together with survey evidence indicating that nearly 40 percent of U.S. workers have signed a noncompete agreement with their employer at some time during their career (Starr, Bishara and Prescott, 2017), no-poaching agreements may reduce workers' job opportunities. To the extent this practice has grown or become more effective, it might help explain a recent puzzle in the U.S. job market: unemployment has reached a 16-year low and job openings are at an all-time
high, yet wage growth has remained surprisingly sluggish.
A Postscript
The first draft of this paper was circulated in the spring of 2017. A great deal has happened since then as a result of it. First, not long after the paper was circulated Alan Krueger and I were contacted by representatives of the Attorney General's Office of the State of Washington. In their view the nonpoaching clauses in the franchise agreements that we revealed were in violation of the US and Washington Antitrust Laws. They promptly brought suit against many of the franchise firms listed in Appendix Table 1 . Second, as a result of these law suits, by June of 2019 62 franchise companies had removed or abandoned the no-poach clauses from their franchise agreements. Appendix Table 2 lists the names of these companies and the dates at which their no-poach clauses were effectively removed. In principle, because this appendix provides the information needed for a pre/post comparison it could be used to form the basis for the design of a study intended to determine what effect, if any, these agreements may have had on worker wage rates or conditions of employment.
It was certainly not our intention to promote the law suits that resulted from the data we revealed in this paper. Nevertheless, it is instructive that the mere revelation of collusive agreements, whether legal or not, has so quickly provoked a strong response from both the antitrust authorities and the franchisors whose agreements contained these no-poach clauses.
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